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This study examines the proportion of the purchase price allocated to goodwill after the 
successful acquisition of a publicly listed firm. Using hand collected data we document that 
42% of acquirers record a nil amount for goodwill. We find that the amount allocated to 
goodwill is generally unrelated to target firm economic characteristics. In contrast, consistent 
with managerial opportunism we find a positive association between the use of accounting 
based bonus plans to compensate acquiring firm CEOs and the amount allocated to goodwill. 
The amount allocated to goodwill also increases after Australia adopted IFRS which no longer 
required goodwill to be systematically amortised. Other variables associated with goodwill 
recognition include: the acquiring firm’s leverage, the takeover premium, whether the target 
and the bidder operate in the same industry, existing goodwill in the target firm before the 
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Following a business combination, accounting standards require consolidation of the 
acquired entity into the acquiring firm’s financial statements. As part of the first time 
consolidation the parent entity is required to allocate the purchase price to the tangible and 
identifiable intangible assets and liabilities acquired (AASB 3: ‘Business Combinations’). As 
this allocation is based on the fair value of the respective assets and liabilities the acquiring 
firm has significant discretion as to how to allocate the purchase price. Any residual between 
the purchase price and the fair value of the identifiable net assets of the acquired firm is then 
recorded as goodwill. The objective of this study is to examine the proportion of the purchase 
price allocated to goodwill. Specifically, we investigate whether the allocation of the purchase 
price to goodwill after an acquisition is explained by opportunism, takeover characteristics and 
the underlying financial characteristics of the target and bidding firms. 
The motivation for this study is twofold. Firstly, empirical evidence on the allocation 
of the purchase price after successful corporate acquisitions is limited. Given that there is 
discretion in undertaking this allocation, further evidence is needed on whether allocations 
reflect underlying target and bidding firm economic characteristics or are driven by managerial 
opportunism (Holthausen and Watts 2001). Consistent with managerial opportunism, Shalev 
et al. (2013) finds an over-allocation of the purchase price to goodwill when U.S. CEOs receive 
bonuses tied to accounting earnings as this, results in increases in post-acquisition earnings. 
Their study however, is conducted in a setting where goodwill is required to be impaired and 
not required to be amortised post-acquisition. We aim to add to the findings of Shalev et al. 
(2013) by investigating a setting where goodwill accounting changed from systematic 
amortisation to annual impairment. The Australian setting allows us to understand how a 
change in accounting standards impacts on management’s incentives when firms transition 
from local GAAP (systematic amortisation setting) to IFRS (annual impairment setting).  
Secondly, we add to prior research by investigating whether takeover deal 
characteristics impact on goodwill recognition. While goodwill recognition is the outcome of 
a successful acquisition, prior studies have generally ignored the fact that takeover 
characteristics such as, friendly/hostile acquisitions, synergic acquisitions and the bidding firm 
toehold may also explain the amount of recognised goodwill. We argue that when the bidding 
firm has more information about the target prior to the acquisition, less goodwill is recognised. 
In this instance the bidding firm is able to value the target with more certainty and as a result 
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is unlikely to overpay. Furthermore, as goodwill is a measure of acquisition synergies, it is 
expected that more goodwill is recorded when synergistic acquisitions occur. 
Using a sample of 308 successful Australian takeovers from 1998 to 2012 we document 
that in 42% of takeovers the acquiring firm records neither goodwill nor a bargain purchase. 
This high proportion of takeovers with no recorded goodwill is unexpected as it indicates that 
the cost of acquisition in these takeovers is exactly equal to the fair value of the identifiable net 
assets acquired. This finding suggest that bidding firms managers may be using their discretion 
to avoid the costly process of undertaking an accurate purchase price allocation, which includes 
complex valuation exercises.  
We then conduct an analysis of the factors which are associated with the proportion of 
the purchase price recorded as goodwill.  Consistent with managerial opportunism we find that 
CEOs with an accounting based bonus plan allocate a greater proportion of the purchase price 
to goodwill both before and after IFRS adoption. This finding suggests that the U.S. results of 
Shalev et al. (2013) hold in both a goodwill impairment setting and in a goodwill amortisation 
setting. We also find that the proportion of the purchase price allocated to goodwill increases 
after Australia adopted IFRS. This result suggests that firms took advantage of the change in 
accounting requirements by allocating more to goodwill (and less to other depreciable assets) 
so as to achieve an improvement in profitability. Inconsistent with prior findings (e.g., Wong 
and Wong, 2001), we document that the amount allocated to goodwill increases with bidding 
firm leverage.  
In terms of takeover characteristics, we find a positive association between takeover 
premiums and acquired goodwill. This result is expected since a higher premium increases the 
purchase price and this increased amount is likely to flow into the amount recorded as goodwill. 
In contrast to expectations, we find a negative association between synergistic acquisitions (i.e., 
target and bidders which operate in the same industry) and goodwill recognition. In terms of 
target and bidding firms’ underlying economic characteristics we document a positive 
association between the goodwill and the existing goodwill of the target firm suggesting that 
these assets remain part of the unidentifiable intangible assets acquired by the bidding firm. 
Other economic characteristics of the target and bidder firms however, are not associated with 
the proportion of the purchase price allocated to goodwill. Our results also indicate that the 
amount recorded as goodwill is positively associated with the use of cash payment.  
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We contribute to the academic literature in a number of ways. Firstly, we extend the 
accounting choice literature (Fields et al., 2001 and Armstrong et al., 2010) by examining 
managers’ use of discretion in the decision on how to allocate the purchase price in acquisitions. 
Our findings suggest that when given accounting flexibility, some managers use their discretion 
to adjust the amount of the purchase price in a business combination that is allocated to 
goodwill. Secondly, our results indicate that the purchase price allocation is conditional on a 
number of target firm specific factors and takeover characteristics. This finding is of 
importance to research which examines the value relevance of goodwill and goodwill 
impairment (Barth and Clinch 1996; Jennings et al. 1996; Godfrey and Koh 2001; Dahmash et 
al. 2009) as our results indicate that goodwill is endogenously determined. As such, the factors 
that are associated with the purchase price allocation are also likely to be associated with the 
value relevance of goodwill. 
Secondly, we extend previous research which examines the consequences of the 
adoption of IFRS (Barth et al., 2008; Daske et al., 2008; Chalmers et al., 2011a; Chalmers et 
al., 2012, Cotter et al., 2012; Horton et al., 2013; Lai et al., 2013). Assuming that the purchase 
price allocation reflects the underlying characteristics of the takeover and the target and 
acquiring firms, changes in accounting rules are not expected to influence the amount allocated 
to goodwill. In contrast, if the purchase price allocation reflects opportunism we predict that 
pre-IFRS acquiring firms allocated a lower percentage of the purchase price to goodwill. This 
expectation arises because during that time period there was discretion available in regards to 
the amortisation of intangible assets and no discretion regarding the amortisation of goodwill. 
Furthermore, we also expect that after goodwill amortisation was removed (i.e. post- IFRS) 
that the under allocation of the purchase price to goodwill is reduced. Our results are consistent 
with this expectation. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section provides the 
background to accounting for business combinations in Australia and related research. Section 
3 develops the theory and describes the research method. Section 4 provides a discussion of 
the data collection process. Results of our analysis are presented in section 5, whilst section 6 
concludes the paper. 
2. Background  
2.1 Accounting for goodwill in Australia 
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The accounting requirements for corporate acquisitions in Australia are currently 
prescribed in AASB 3 ‘Business Combinations.’ This standard requires goodwill to be 
measured as the difference between the purchase consideration and the fair value of the 
identifiable net assets acquired (paragraph 32). Where the purchase consideration is not cash 
the purchase consideration must be measured using the fair value of the assets or equity 
provided as consideration (paragraph 37). Prior to Australia’s adoption of IFRS,1 the amount 
recorded as goodwill was systematically amortised to earnings over a maximum period of 20 
years (AASB 1013 ‘Accounting for Goodwill’). After the adoption of IFRS however, AASB 
136 ‘Impairment of Assets’ requires that goodwill is no longer amortised but is subject to annual 
impairment testing. 
Johnson and Petrone (1998) separate the amount recorded as purchased goodwill into the 
following components: 
i) The difference between the fair value and book value of the target firm’s recognised 
net assets; 
ii) The fair value of net assets not recognised by the target firm such as internally 
generated intangible assets; 
iii) The fair value of the going concern component of the target firm as a standalone 
business (i.e., internally generated goodwill); 
iv) The fair value of any synergies arising from the business combination between the 
target and bidding firms (i.e. purchased goodwill); 
v) Over or undervaluation of the consideration paid by the bidder.   
vi) Over or under payment by the bidder 
Under the requirements of the accounting standards only components iii) and iv) should 
be recorded as goodwill. Components i) and ii) are required under accounting standards to be 
recorded separately as part of the business combination. However, in practice due to 
measurement difficulties or a lack of expertise by the acquiring firm and their auditors it is 
possible that these components are included as part of goodwill. Similarly, components v) and 
vi) do not represent goodwill but are likely to be included in the amount designated as goodwill 
due to this amount being recorded as the residual balance. As the manner of calculating 
goodwill relies on estimating the fair values of non-traded assets managers are afforded 
                                                          
1 Australian firms with financial years ending 31 December adopted IFRS in 2005 and Australian firms with 
financial year ending 30 June adopted IFRS in 2006. 
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significant discretion in determining the amount allocated to any class of assets and ultimately 
goodwill. 
2.2 Related research on goodwill 
The accounting for purchased goodwill has been the subject of controversy for many 
years. The first point of contention regarding purchased goodwill is whether acquired goodwill 
is an asset (Johnson and Petrone 1998). The recognition of goodwill as an asset is problematic 
as it is arguable as to whether goodwill provides future economic benefits. As a reflection of 
the uncertainty as to whether goodwill is an asset, the preferred treatment of the earlier UK 
accounting standard was that goodwill acquired in an acquisition be immediately written-off 
to reserves (Standard Accounting Practice 22: ‘Accounting for Goodwill’). To test whether 
goodwill warrants reporting on the balance sheet as an asset prior studies have examined the 
value relevance of goodwill (Chauvin and Hirschey 1994; Barth and Clinch 1996; Jennings et 
al., 1996; Godfrey and Koh 2001; Bugeja and Gallery, 2006; Dahmash et al., 2009). Generally, 
these studies find that investors view recorded amounts of goodwill as representing valuable 
economic resources. 
Another area which has been investigated in prior literature is the treatment of goodwill 
post- recognition. Until recently, most countries required that goodwill be subject to periodic 
amortisation with additional write-offs (i.e., impairments) required if goodwill was considered 
impaired. For instance, until the issue of Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 142 
(SFAS 142: ‘Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets)’ in 2001, goodwill in the U.S. was required 
to be amortised over a maximum period of 40 years. Empirical studies in this area have shed 
light on the causes and market reaction to goodwill write-offs. 
In terms of the causes of goodwill write-offs, prior studies document that acquisition 
characteristics and performance indicators are associated with goodwill write-offs. Goodwill 
impairment has been found to be positively associated with the payment of higher takeover 
premiums and the amount initially recorded as goodwill (Hayn and Hughes 2006; Gu and Lev 
2011 and Li et al., 2011). Empirical findings also suggest that the component of consideration 
paid using overvalued stock is positively associated with goodwill impairment (Hayn and 
Hughes 2006; Gu and Lev 2011 and Li et al., 2011). Goodwill impairment frequency has also 
been found to be lower in focus enhancing acquisitions (Li et al., 2011) and in takeovers made 
by firms with strong corporate governance mechanisms (Gu and Lev 2011). Furthermore, 
Godfrey and Koh (2009) find that goodwill impairment charges in the U.S. are negatively 
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related to a firm’s investment opportunity set. In the Australian setting, Chalmers et al. (2011b) 
find that goodwill charges are negatively associated with a firm’s investment opportunity set 
only in the goodwill impairment regime (i.e. post- IFRS). 
Evidence on the market reaction to goodwill write-offs provides mixed findings. While 
Francis, et al. (1996) find little share price reaction to goodwill write-offs, others have 
documented evidence of negative abnormal returns (e.g. Hirschey and Richardson 2002; Hayn 
and Hughes 2006; Bens et al. 2011; Li et al. 2011). Furthermore, Abu Ghazaleh et al. (2012) 
document a significantly negative association between goodwill write-offs and the market 
value of equity. 
Prior research has also documented that when given a choice managers often prefer to 
minimise the amount recorded as goodwill. For example, prior to the introduction of an 
enforceable accounting standard the most common methods used to account for goodwill in 
Australia avoided systematic amortisation (Gibson and Francis 1975; Anderson and Zimmer 
1992). U.S. research has studied reasons for firms’ preference for the pooling rather than the 
purchase method of accounting for acquisitions and concludes that this choice is driven by a 
desire to maximise reported earnings (Gagnon 1967; Copeland and Wodjak 1969; Aboody et 
al., 2000 and Ayers et al., 2002).  
More recently Shalev et al. (2013) study the amount allocated to goodwill for a sample 
of U.S. acquisitions. Consistent with opportunism they find evidence showing an over-
allocation to goodwill by firms whose CEOs receive a greater proportion of their remuneration 
from accounting based bonus-plans. As goodwill is not amortised, allocating a higher amount 
of the purchase price to goodwill likely increases post-acquisition earnings and bonuses. 
However, as their study takes place solely during a period of time when accounting standards 
required goodwill to be impaired, they do not provide evidence on whether the move from 
goodwill amortisation to impairment changed the proportion of the acquisition price allocated 
to goodwill. This study provides such evidence. 
3. Theory development and research method 
3.1 Determinants of the purchase price allocated to goodwill 
3.1.1 Opportunism 
Under the opportunistic view, managers use their discretion to either over or under 
allocate the purchase price to goodwill. The likelihood of opportunistic behaviour arises 
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because the measurement of goodwill requires numerous estimates of fair values when 
assigning the purchase price to identifiable net assets (Holthausen and Watts 2001; Ramanna 
2008). In particular, the majority of assets acquired are unlikely to be traded on active markets 
increasing the need for subjective fair value estimates. We argue that managers may use this 
discretion to opportunistically determine the amount recorded as goodwill for a number of 
reasons.  For instance, firms may have incentives to minimise the costs of completing an 
accurate purchase price allocation. As mentioned in section 2.1, the accounting standard 
requires acquiring firms to calculate the fair values of both recorded and unrecorded target firm 
identifiable net assets when calculating goodwill. This exercise is complex and requires an 
acquiring firm and their auditors to undertake difficult and costly valuation exercises. For some 
firms it may be simpler and less costly to simply pro rata the value of the purchase consideration 
across the non-monetary assets of the target firm so that the amount allocated to such assets 
equates to the purchase consideration resulting in no goodwill being recorded. An additional 
incentive for recording a nil balance of goodwill is that it also avoids the complex annual task 
for preparers and auditors of testing the goodwill balance for impairment.2 Finally, recognising 
a nil amount of goodwill means that firms do not have to recognise decreases in post-
acquisition earnings either through systematic amortisation or irregular impairment charges. 
In line with managerial opportunism, we expect the decision to recognise goodwill to 
be associated with the financial reporting environment. Prior to Australia’s adoption of IFRS, 
goodwill was amortised for a period not exceeding 20 years which decreases post-acquisition 
profits. This gives managers an incentive to report higher earnings by allocating more of the 
purchase price to longer lived assets or to assets with an indefinite life and less to goodwill, to 
avoid recording the systematic goodwill amortisation expense. This expectation is supported 
by prior research which suggests that managers prefer to avoid the amortisation of goodwill 
due to its income decreasing effect. For example, Gore et al. (2000) report that U.K. CEOs with 
profit based compensation plans prefer to immediately write-off goodwill to reserves as 
opposed to recording goodwill as an asset. Furthermore, U.S. research indicates that firms are 
willing to pay an additional premium to qualify for the use of the pooling method of accounting 
and hence avoid the need to amortise goodwill (Robinson and Shane 1990 and Ayers et al., 
                                                          
2 Prior to Australia’s adoption of IFRS goodwill was also tested annually for impairment (AASB 1013 
paragraph 5.4).  In 2009, The IASB issued IFRS for Small and Medium Sized Entities (SME’s) which highlights 
that accounting standard setters recognise the complexity of goodwill impairment testing. That standard requires 
SME’s to amortise goodwill over its estimated useful life, with the life set at 10 years if it cannot be reliably 
estimated (paragraphs 18.19, 18.20 and 19.23).   
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2002). This line of research suggests that firms are reluctant to record goodwill when it needs 
to be amortised.3 Thus, it is expected that before the adoption of IFRS in Australia, managers 
used their discretion to recognise less goodwill. 
Post- Australia’s adoption of IFRS, however, goodwill was no longer subject to 
amortisation but was subject to annual impairment testing. If managers act opportunistically 
they have an incentive to over-allocate an amount to goodwill as opposed to other depreciable 
assets to avoid a systematic annual charge against earnings (Shalev et al., 2013). A counter 
argument is that over-allocating an amount to goodwill increases the probability that the firm 
needs to impair goodwill which potentially increases earnings volatility post-acquisition. There 
are also costs associated with the subsequent impairment of goodwill such as negative stock 
returns (e.g. Bens et al., 2011; Li et al., 2011) and a decrease in firm value (e.g. Abu Ghazaleh 
et al., 2012). Although these capital market effects may motivate managers to not over-allocate 
an amount to goodwill we argue that there is an important difference between goodwill 
impairment and amortisation. In particular, managers have greater discretion as to when an 
impairment charge is recorded compared to certain annual amortisation. Additionally, it is 
unlikely that at the time of making a takeover that bidding firm management expects that they 
will subsequently need to impair goodwill, particularly if they are ‘infected’ with hubris (Roll 
1986). 
There are also likely to be contractual incentives for managing the amount recorded as 
goodwill. First, goodwill and other intangible assets are typically not included in the calculation 
of leverage in debt contract covenants (Cotter, 1998), prompting managers to allocate more of 
the purchase price to tangible assets rather than to goodwill (e.g. Grinyer et al., 1991; Wong 
and Wong 2001; Beatty and Weber 2006).4  Second, when CEOs receive a higher level of 
compensation which is tied to accounting earnings they have an incentive to manipulate the 
                                                          
33 Accounting standards in Australia have never allowed the use of the pooling method of accounting. 
4 Beatty and Weber (2006) document that more than 50 per cent of bank debt contracts had covenants that exclude 
goodwill (amongst other intangible assets). In terms of the association between goodwill and leverage, Grinyer et 
al. (1991) find that the amount of goodwill is negatively related to acquiring firm leverage.  Wong and Wong 
(2001), however, argue that this finding is also consistent with an investment opportunity set explanation.  They 
find that the amount allocated to goodwill for a sample of New Zealand takeovers is higher for firms with lower 
leverage and interpret their result to indicate that firms with lower leverage have a better investment opportunity 
set and as a result allocate a greater amount to goodwill.  The influence of leverage on goodwill recognition is 
also examined by Gore et al. (2000). They study management’s preference for capitalising goodwill or 
immediately writing goodwill off against reserves using a survey conducted in the UK.  They find that manager’s 
prefer goodwill capitalisation when their firm has high gearing and a gearing based debt covenant restriction in 




amount recorded as goodwill to maximise their remuneration (Watts and Zimmerman 1990; 
Shalev et al., 2013). Thus, we expect that prior to the adoption of IFRS, when a firm 
compensates their CEO using an accounting based bonus plan that the firm minimises the 
amount allocated to goodwill to avoid goodwill amortisation and hence maximise earnings. 
Furthermore, when goodwill amortisation was replaced by impairment post- IFRS we expect 
this association to reverse. 
Therefore under the opportunistic view, managers use their discretion to manage the 
amount allocated to goodwill. This leads to the first hypothesis. 
H1a: The amount allocated to acquired goodwill increases after the adoption of IFRS 
and decreases with bidding firm leverage. 
H1b: The amount allocated to acquired goodwill is associated with the use of CEO 
bonus plans based on accounting profit. 
Monitoring of opportunistic behaviour 
In order to curb managerial discretion and to protect the interest of shareholders, firms 
are likely to put monitoring systems in place. We take the view that Big 4 auditors provide 
higher quality audits and object to managerial discretion to misreport the accounts (e.g. Francis 
and Yu, 2009). Also, Big 4 auditors possess more expertise and resources than non-Big 4 firms 
and are better able to accurately identify unrecognised intangible assets and to also value both 
recognised and unrecognised target firm assets. In contrast, non-Big 4 auditors are perhaps 
more likely to accept a simplistic approach of proportionately allocating the purchase price 
across existing target firm net assets resulting in no goodwill being recorded. Big 4 auditors 
are also more likely to have the skills to conduct complex goodwill impairment testing. 
Therefore, we expect that bidders audited by a Big 4 audit firm to report more goodwill as Big 
4 audit firms have both the ability to measure goodwill accurately and the incentives to curb 
managers’ discretion to prepare their purchase price allocation opportunistically.  
Furthermore, it is possible that the relative size of the target firm to the bidding firm 
impacts on the acquirer’s decision to recognise goodwill. Grinyer et al. (1991) argue that 
takeovers which are considered large compared to the bidding firm’s size attract more attention 
(for example, from the media). In this instance, we expect managers to exercise less discretion 
and expect that they devote more resources to achieving greater accuracy in the allocation of 
the purchase price to the various assets, including goodwill. Auditors are also likely to pay 
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greater attention to the purchase price allocation in larger takeovers due to materiality reasons. 
As a result, we expect a positive association between the relative size of the takeover and 
acquired goodwill. 
In summary, external monitoring from audit firms and other stakeholders are expected 
to curb managers’ discretion in misreporting acquired goodwill suggesting a positive 
association between acquired goodwill and monitoring practices. This leads to our second 
hypothesis. 
H2: There is a positive association between acquired goodwill and the use of Big 4 
auditors and the relative size of the acquisition. 
 
3.1.2 Takeover deal characteristics 
The successful acquisition of a target firm is the result of extensive negotiations 
between the bidding and target firm. We argue that a number of takeover characteristics 
influence the amount allocated to goodwill as they impact the purchase price. We argue that 
greater access to information about the target firm gives the bidder an increased ability to 
accurately identify and value the target firm assets both before and after making a bid. As a 
result, the consideration offered is expected to be closer to the fair value of the net identifiable 
assets leading to a lower risk of overpayment and hence a reduction in the amount recorded as 
goodwill (i.e., category vi. of Johnson and Petrone 1998).  
A higher ownership interest by the bidder in the target firm prior to the takeover (i.e., 
toehold) is likely to give the bidder greater access to target firm financial information prior to 
the takeover. This better information set may arise for example through the preparation of 
equity accounting. In addition, a prior equity stake in the target may provide the bidding firm 
with the ability to appoint a director to the target firm board thus reducing information 
asymmetry. Hence, we predict a negative association between the pre- takeover ownership 
interest of the bidding firm and acquired goodwill. 
Whether the takeover is friendly or hostile is also expected to be associated with 
acquired goodwill. In friendly takeovers, the target firm typically grants permission for the 
bidder to conduct due diligence. This due diligence process provides the bidder with more 
detailed information on the value and existence of target firm assets and as a result the bidder 
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may be less likely to over pay for the target firm. As a result, we predict a negative association 
between friendly takeovers and acquired goodwill. 
A higher takeover premium may result in a greater amount of the purchase price being 
recorded as goodwill. The additional premium is expected to flow through to the amount 
recorded as goodwill, given that goodwill is calculated as the difference between the 
acquisition price and the target firm net identifiable assets. Takeover premiums may also reflect 
the acquisition synergies that the bidding firm expect from an acquisition (Hayn and Hughes 
2006; Sudarsanam and Sorwar 2010). 5  Arguably operating synergies are expected to be 
greatest when the bidding firm and the target firm are in the same industry. Given that goodwill 
is argued to be a measure of acquisition synergies, we expect the takeover premium and 
acquisitions in the same industry as the bidder to be positively associated with goodwill 
recognition. 
Finally, we argue that the payment method used (equity versus cash) may also explain 
the amount of the purchase price allocated to goodwill. Results from prior research suggest that 
the bidding firm is likely to pay higher premiums when the payment method is cash (e.g., 
Bugeja and Da Silva Rosa 2010). As a result, we expect more goodwill to be recorded when 
the payment method is cash. Moreover, equity payments by the bidding firm may indicate that 
the equity of the bidding firm is overvalued (Myers and Majluf 1984). This overvaluation is 
likely to increase the amount recorded as goodwill. Given the two competing views, we argue 
that there is an association between the payment method and the amount of the purchase price 
recorded as goodwill but do not make a prediction as to the sign of the direction. 
The above arguments lead to the following hypotheses. 
H3a: There is a negative association between acquired goodwill and the bidding firm 
toehold and friendly acquisitions. 
H3b: There is a positive association between acquired goodwill and takeover premiums 
and acquisitions in the same industry. 
H3c: There is an association between acquired goodwill and the payment method. 
3.1.3 Economic characteristics of the target and bidding firm 
                                                          
5 A higher takeover premium is also paid if managers suffer from hubris or overconfidence whereby they 
overestimate their ability to generate future returns (Roll 1986; Malmendier and Tate 2008). 
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 The purchase price allocation to goodwill should fundamentally be determined by the 
underlying economic characteristics of the target and the bidding firms. We argue that more 
goodwill is recognised in acquisitions of target firms which have greater amounts of existing 
goodwill prior to the acquisition. The existing goodwill of the target firm is expected to remain 
part of the unidentifiable intangible assets identified by the bidding firm (Shalev et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, the method of accounting for a business combination requires the recording of all 
tangible and identifiable intangible assets at fair value before calculating the amount of 
goodwill. Therefore, it is expected that a higher amount of acquired target firm tangible and 
intangible assets pre-acquisition reduces the amount allocated to goodwill.  
 From an efficiency point of view, goodwill is a measure of value creation. Goodwill is 
recognised as the bidding firm believes that it will earn future ‘surplus’ profits from its 
investment in the target firms compared to an alternative investment with similar level of risks 
(Bryer 1995 p.286). These ‘surplus’ profits arise for a variety of reasons including good 
customer relations, good employee relations, acquisition of technical and managerial talent, 
and monopoly power, which cannot be separately identified and valued (Tearney 1973; 
Chauvin and Hirschey 1994). We argue that the bidding firm adjusts the purchase consideration 
to recognise the future synergies and higher future firm performance ensuing from their 
acquisition which in turn increases the amount of acquired goodwill. 
Finally, Li et al. (2011) argue that overvalued bidders are more likely to overpay in an 
acquisition. This overpayment is expected to overstate the amount allocated to goodwill since 
goodwill is the residual between the purchase price and the identifiable net assets acquired. As 
a result, we argue that there is a positive association between acquired goodwill and overvalued 
bidders. 
The above discussion leads to the following hypotheses: 
H4a: There is a positive association between acquired goodwill and the existing 
goodwill of the target firm, the target firm’s growth potential and overvalued bidders. 
H4b: There is a negative association between acquired goodwill and existing tangible 
and identifiable intangible assets of the target firm. 
 
We empirically test the factors that influence the choice to record goodwill using the 
following tobit regression model:6 
                                                          
6 A tobit regression is used since the amount allocated to goodwill is censored at zero. 
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GW_DV = i + 1IFRS + 2B_LEV + 3BONUS + 4IFRSxBONUS + 5 BIG4 + 6RELSIZE + 
7TOEHOLD + 8FRIENDLY + 9PREMIUM + 10SAMEIND +11PAYCASH + 12T_GW_DV 
+13T_PPE_DV + 14T_IIA_DV + 15T_MB + 16B_MB + i                                                                                      (1)                                                                                                                                                                                      
The dependent variable GW_DV is the dollar value of the purchase price allocated to 
goodwill scaled by deal value. Our first set of variables capture managerial opportunism. To 
identify takeovers in which the first year of consolidation occurs after Australia adopted IFRS 
we include in the model an indicator variable (IFRS).  We also control for contractual incentives 
to manage the amount allocated to goodwill. Bidder firm leverage (B_LEV) measured using 
the ratio of debt to equity for the financial year prior to the acquisition is used to control for the 
incentive of firms to allocate the purchase price to tangible assets which are included in debt 
covenant ratios. The influence of CEO bonus plans is controlled in the model using an indicator 
variable coded as one if the firm compensates their managers using a bonus plan based on 
accounting earnings (BONUS). This variable is also interacted with the IFRS indicator variable 
to determine whether the association between CEO compensation structure and the amount 
allocated to goodwill changed after the adoption of IFRS (IFRSxBONUS). 
To capture the strength of the monitoring system in place to curb managerial 
opportunism we include in the model, an indicator variable highlighting acquisitions in which 
the acquiring firm uses a Big 4 auditor in the first financial year in which the target firm is 
consolidated, zero otherwise (BIG4). As indicated above, we include bidding firm leverage in 
the model. This variable also controls for the monitoring role of debt holders.7 We also include 
in the regression the relative size of the target to the bidder measured using the natural 
logarithm of the target firm to acquiring firm market capitalisation two months before the 
takeover announcement (RELSIZE).   
To control for takeover characteristics we include four variables in model (1). First, we 
control for the equity ownership of the bidder in the target at the date of the takeover 
announcement (TOEHOLD).  We also identify whether the takeover offer is friendly. Friendly 
takeovers are denoted in the regression using a binary variable coded as one when the initial 
recommendation of the target firm board is takeover acceptance (FRIENDLY). To capture 
synergies arising from the acquisition we control for the takeover premium and industry of the 
target and bidding firms. The takeover premium (PREMIUM) is calculated as the offer price 
                                                          
7 We use the acquiring firm leverage ratio the year before the acquisition to exclude the effects of the takeover 




minus the target share price two months prior to the takeover announcement, divided by the 
price two months prior to the takeover announcement. We control for target and bidding firm 
pairs in the same industry (using two-digit GICS codes) by including an indicator variable set 
equal to one in such takeovers (SAMEIND). The consideration form used by the bidding firm 
is controlled through the use of an indicator variable denoting takeovers in which the payment 
form is completely cash, zero otherwise (PAYCASH). 
 We also control for the economic characteristics of the target and bidding firms. 
First, we include the amount of the existing goodwill on the target firm balance sheet 
(T_GW_DV). Goodwill already recorded by the target firm is expected to remain part of the 
unidentifiable assets of the combined group and as a result should be positively associated with 
the percentage of the purchase price allocated to goodwill. As the amount allocated to goodwill 
is determined after adjusting the fair values of other target firm assets we include controls for 
the target firm’s net property plant and equipment (T_PPE_DV) and recognised identifiable 
intangible assets (T_IIA_DV). These three variables are extracted from the target firm financial 
statements for the financial year prior to the takeover and are scaled by deal value. If the 
difference between the purchase consideration and the book value of target firm assets is 
recorded firstly against already recognised assets then there is expected to be a negative 
association between T_PPE_DV and T_IIA_DV and recorded goodwill. To capture the growth 
potential of the target firm, we control for the target firm’s market to book ratio calculated two 
months before the takeover announcement (T_MB). 8  Finally, we proxy bidding firm 
overvaluation using the market to book ratio (B_MB) also measured two months before the 
takeover announcement.  
We control for industry fixed effects in the estimation of model (1) through the use of 
indicator variables based on the target firm two digit GICS code. In the interest of brevity we 
do not report the results on these variables. Standard errors are also clustered by the year of 
takeover announcement to correct for potential serial correlation. Appendix 1 provides a 
summary of the definitions of all variables used in this study. 
4. Sample and data 
                                                          
8 The market value two months before the takeover announcement is used as there is often a run-up in target 
share price leading up to the takeover announcement (Schwert 1996). In additional tests we also include the 
target firm sales growth in the two years leading up to the takeover announcement (T_GROWTH) as an 
additional variable in the model. 
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The Connect 4 Mergers and Acquisitions database is used to identify all takeovers 
announced for Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listed targets between 1998 and 2012.  
This search identified 1,239 takeovers. Since this study is investigating the amount allocated 
to goodwill after successful acquisitions it is necessary to exclude 394 unsuccessful takeovers. 
Also, as the amount of goodwill is collected from the financial statements of the successful 
bidder we delete 346 takeovers in which the bidding firm is not listed on the ASX. For a similar 
reason it is also necessary to eliminate 20 takeovers in which the acquiring firm is delisted from 
the ASX prior to the dissemination of their financial statements post- acquisition.  Due to 
missing data needed to estimate the regression model we remove 171 observations from the 
sample. This sample collection process is summarised in Table 1. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the temporal distribution of the sample. The two years with 
the highest proportion of takeovers are 2006 and 2000 with respectively 10.4% and 9.7% of 
successful takeovers occurring in these two years. The lowest number of takeovers occurs in 
the first year of the sample (i.e., 1998). 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
  
The breakdown of the sample by target and acquiring firm industry is shown in Panel 
B of Table 2. Industrial classification is based on target and acquiring firm two digit GICS 
codes. Approximately 30% of target and bidding firms are from the materials sector. The 
second largest sector included in our sample is financial firms (approximately 16%), followed 
by takeovers in the consumer discretionary industry (between 13-14%). The industry sector 
with the lowest representation in the sample is utilities. We control for industry fixed effects in 
the estimation of our regression models using indicator variables for target firm two digit GICS 
codes. 
We collect the amount of the purchase price allocated to goodwill for each acquisition 
by firstly downloading the acquiring firm’s financial statements subsequent to the takeover 
from the Morningstar DatAnalysis database. We then read through the notes to the accounts to 
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determine the first year in which the target firm is consolidated.  For this financial year we 
hand collect the amount (if any) of the purchase price allocated to goodwill and identifiable 
intangible assets.9 We also hand collect for that year details of the acquiring firm auditor and 
whether the financial statements are prepared using IFRS. The target firm takeover documents 
lodged with the ASX are used to manually collect information on the recommendation of the 
target firm board to shareholders. In a similar fashion, we collect from the bidding firm 
documents lodged with the ASX details of:  the bidding firm toehold, the initial offer price and 
the method of payment. The Morningstar DatAnalysis database is used as the source of both 
the target and bidding firm takeover documents.  
Share price information used to calculate takeover premiums, relative size and market 
to book ratios are extracted from the Core Research Database maintained by SIRCA. 
Accounting information needed to calculate bidding firm leverage, target firm asset values (i.e, 
goodwill, identifiable intangible assets and property plant and equipment) and the book values 
of equity for the target and acquiring firm are obtained from the financial statements released 
for the year prior to the takeover announcement. We determine the existence of an accounting 
based bonus plan for the bidding firm CEO by reading through the directors’ report included 
in the bidding firm’s annual report in the year prior to the takeover announcement. 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables included in the regression model.  
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Panel A of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for each variable after partitioning the 
firms into those that record no goodwill and those that report positive goodwill. The results 
indicate that CEO bonuses (BONUS ($000)) are significantly higher for firms which report a 
non-zero balance of goodwill. This preliminary evidence is consistent with the opportunistic 
argument whereby managers use their discretion to recognise more goodwill. The results also 
indicate that firms which record goodwill have higher leverage (B_LEV) and are more likely 
to engage Big 4 auditors (BIG4) consistent with a monitoring explanation. Firms recognising 
goodwill also report larger amounts of acquired identifiable intangible assets (IIA ($m)), and 
are more likely to use cash as the method of payment (PAYCASH). Surprisingly, the descriptive 
                                                          
9  Due to a lack of disclosure we are unable to further partition identifiable intangibles into separate categories 
(e.g., brand names, patents etc.). 
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results show that goodwill is less likely to be recorded when the target and the acquiring firm 
operate in the same industry (SAMEIND). The findings also show that there is no statistical 
difference in the proportion of firms with a non-zero balance of goodwill after the adoption of 
IFRS (IFRS).10 
Panel B of Table 3 presents the mean for each of the variables after partitioning the 
sample by whether the takeover is first consolidated before or after the adoption of IFRS. A 
comparison of variables before and after the adoption of IFRS shows that the percentage of the 
purchase price allocated to goodwill is higher after the adoption of IFRS, although the 
difference is insignificant. A number of the other variables show significant changes after the 
adoption of IFRS. The results show that the target and bidding firm market-to-book ratios 
(T_MB and B_MB) and the use of friendly acquisitions (FRIENDLY) are significantly higher 
in the post- IFRS sub-sample.11 In contrast, after the adoption of IFRS we find a significant 
decrease in the ownership stake of the bidder in the target firm (TOEHOLD), and acquisitions 
in which the target and bidder are in the same industry (SAMEIND). 
Panel C of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables in model (1) 
partitioned by whether the CEO of the acquiring firm has an accounting based compensation 
plan in place for the year prior to the takeover. There is no significant difference in the 
proportion of the purchase price allocated to goodwill and identifiable intangible assets for 
firms with and without a CEO accounting based bonus plan in place. We find that acquiring 
firms which use accounting based bonus plans are more likely to offer cash payment 
(PAYCASH) and engage Big 4 audit firms (BIG4). The greater use of Big 4 auditors by these 
firms is suggestive of larger firms remunerating their CEO with accounting based bonus 
schemes. 
                                                          
10 A year-by-year breakdown of the proportion of acquiring firms which record a zero balance of goodwill 
shows that between 1998 and 2007 only two years have 50% or more firms recording zero goodwill (i.e., 1999 
and 2002). In contrast, between 2008 and 2012, in each year, more than 50% of firms recording a nil balance of 
goodwill. As presented in Panel A Table 3 however, the association between the proportion of firms with nil 
goodwill and the adoption of IFRS is not statistically significant. 
11 The significant increase in friendly acquisitions after the adoption of IFRS is potentially suggestive of 
managers increasing acquisition activity after the adoption of IFRS to possibly take advantage of the change in 
accounting rules for goodwill amortisation.  Further examination for instance, reveals that the percentage of 
friendly acquisitions in our sample was: 73% in 2004; 96% in 2005 and 84% in 2006.  Although, this may 
suggest that managers potentially timed acquisitions to take place after the adoption of IFRS it is problematic for 
us to ascertain whether this is the case.  We leave this question for investigation in future research. 
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The descriptive statistics presented in Table 3 show the presence of significant outliers. 
As a result we winsorise the top and bottom 1% of the continuous variables when estimating 
model (1). 
Table 4 presents a Pearson correlation matrix for the variables included in the regression 
model. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
We find a significant positive correlation between bidding firm leverage (B_LEV) and 
the percentage allocated to goodwill. Consistent with predictions there is a significant negative 
association between the acquiring firm toehold (TOEHOLD) and the amount allocated to 
goodwill. Also in line with expectations, there is a significant positive correlation between 
takeover premiums (PREMIUM) and the percentage of the purchase price allocated to 
goodwill. As predicted, the results show a significant positive correlation between the 
proportion of the purchase price allocated to goodwill and the pre- takeover goodwill of the 
target firm (T_GW_DV). The positive correlation between pre-takeover target firm PPE 
(T_PPE_DV) and the proportion allocated to goodwill is however unexpected. The size of the 
correlations between the independent variables included in the model (1) indicates that 
multicollinearity is unlikely to be a concern with the estimation of the regression model. This 
is confirmed by VIF diagnostics testing conducted after estimating the regression model. 
5. Results 
5.1 Purchase price allocated to goodwill 
The results of estimating regression model (1) examining the factors which influence 
the percentage of the purchase price allocated to goodwill are presented in Table 5. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
The first six independent variables are proxies for opportunism and monitoring. The 
indicator variable denoting takeovers consolidated using IFRS is positive and significant 
indicating that the change from goodwill amortisation to goodwill impairment increased the 
proportion of the purchase price allocated to goodwill. This finding indicates that firms have 
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taken advantage of the new accounting regime to allocate more of the purchase price to a non-
amortised asset which results in higher reported earnings. The results also show that acquiring 
firms with higher pre-acquisition leverage (B_LEV) are more likely to allocate a greater 
percentage of the purchase price to goodwill.12 This finding is inconsistent with an opportunism 
explanation but could be suggestive of the increased monitoring of debt holders in financial 
reporting. Greater monitoring of borrowers may be more likely in Australia due to the 
prevalence of corporate private lending from banks as opposed to public debt issues (Cotter, 
1998).13 
The result on BONUS is positive and significant, but the interaction of this variable with 
IFRS is insignificant. As such, our results suggest that bidding firms which compensate their 
CEO with accounting based remuneration allocate a greater proportion of the purchase price to 
goodwill and this association was unchanged after Australia’s adoption of IFRS. A possible 
explanation of this finding is that before IFRS adoption goodwill was amortised over a 
maximum period of 20 years. As this amortisation period likely exceeds the useful life 
employed for other tangible assets, allocating a greater amount of the purchase price to 
goodwill is likely to minimise depreciation and amortisation charges and maximise firm profit. 
Turning to the variables which proxy for firm monitoring we find no association between Big 
4 audit firms (BIG4) and the relative size of the target to the bidder (RELSIZE) and the amount 
of the deal value allocated to goodwill.14 
H3a predicts that due to lower information asymmetry the proportion of the purchase 
price recorded as goodwill is lower in friendly acquisitions and acquisitions in which the 
bidding firm has a higher toehold. The results, however, are inconsistent with expectations with 
an insignificant coefficient on both TOEHOLD and FRIENDLY. We find a significant positive 
association between takeover premiums (PREMIUM) and the percentage of the purchase price 
allocated to goodwill. This result is unsurprising because as discussed by Johnson and Petrone 
                                                          
12 This result is inconsistent with prior studies as firms with higher leverage would be expected to allocate a 
greater proportion of the purchase price to tangible assets to allow the firm to loosen any debt covenants that are 
defined excluding intangible assets.  Our results are also inconsistent with Wong and Wong (2001) who argue 
that firms with low leverage have a better investment opportunity set and as a result allocate a greater amount of 
the purchase price to goodwill. 
13 As a robustness test we re-estimate our regression model using the debt-to-assets ratio as an alternative 
measure of bidding firm leverage.  The coefficient on this revised leverage measure is positive and significant at 
the 10% level. The conclusions from our other results remain unchanged. 
14 We also estimate the regression replacing the relative size variable with separate variables for the acquiring 
and target firm size measured using the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation of each firm two months 
prior to the takeover announcement.  Both the target and bidder size variables in this alternative regression are 
insignificant and the other results remain unchanged. 
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(1998), goodwill is calculated as the residual between the purchase price and the fair value of 
the net assets acquired. Since a higher premium mechanically increases the size of the purchase 
price this is likely to result in a higher amount being recorded as the residual difference (i.e., 
goodwill). The coefficient on SAMEIND is significant but the negative sign is counter to our 
expectations. As synergies would be predicted to be higher in takeovers amongst firms in the 
same industry it was expected that these takeovers would result in a higher amount being 
allocated to goodwill.  
We find that goodwill is more likely to be recorded when the method of payment is 
cash (PAYCASH). As acquiring firms which offer equity have flexibility in regards to the value 
attributed to the purchase consideration our findings suggest that acquiring firms use this 
flexibility to record less goodwill. An alternative explanation is that the characteristics of target 
firms acquired with cash are associated with a higher level of purchased goodwill. Interestingly, 
our findings are inconsistent with prior studies which document greater goodwill and goodwill 
impairment when equity is used as payment consideration (Hayn and Hughes 2006; Gu and 
Lev 2011 and Li et al., 2011). 
In terms of the economic characteristics of the target firm, we find only the coefficient 
on T_GW_DV to be significant in the predicted direction with the results indicating a higher 
amount is allocated to goodwill when the target firm has greater pre-existing goodwill. 
Surprisingly, the target and bidder firm market-to-book ratios are insignificant in the regression 
results.  
5.2 Additional analysis 
5.2.1 Self-selection bias in CEO compensation structure 
Accounting and finance researchers are frequently confronted in their studies with 
issues relating to selection bias (Tucker 2010; Lennox et al., 2012). This self-selection issue 
occurs because firm decisions are typically chosen from a number of different courses of action 
and the researcher is usually unable to observe all the factors that drive the chosen outcome.  
As highlighted by Maddala, (1991), if firm selection occurs non-randomly then regression 
analysis may lead to biased coefficients due to omitted correlated variables. 
A commonly used approach to control for selection bias is the Heckman (1979) two-
stage approach. This method requires the estimation of a first-stage probit regression which 
models the selection choice of interest. This first-stage regression estimates a bias correction 
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term (i.e., the inverse Mills ratio) which is then included as an additional variable in the second 
stage regression. As indicated by Lennox et al. (2012) the use of the Heckman (1979) method 
requires the identification of an exclusion variable which is included in the first-stage probit 
model but which can be validly omitted from the second-stage regression. 
The results presented above show that acquiring firms which compensate their CEO 
using an accounting based bonus plan allocate a greater amount of the purchase price to 
goodwill. As discussed by Shalev et al. (2013), this relationship is subject to endogeneity 
concerns as compensation structure and purchase price allocations may be driven by the same 
underlying variables. For instance, Smith and Watts (1992) argue that the use of accounting-
based compensation may be negatively related to firm growth options.  Simultaneously, Wong 
and Wong (2001) argue that a firm’s investment opportunity set is also associated with a firm’s 
purchase price allocation to goodwill. Shalev et al. (2013) also argue that a CEO may alter their 
compensation structure to ensure that greater compensation is tied to accounting earnings and 
then manipulate the amount allocated to goodwill. 
Due to the difficulty associated with identifying an exclusion variable to model the 
choice of the use of accounting based-bonus plans we do not conduct a Heckman (1979) two-
stage approach. Instead we partially address the self-selection concern by partitioning our 
sample into those firms with and without a CEO accounting based bonus plan and estimate 
model (1) separately for each of these two groups. These results are presented in Table 6. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 
An analysis of the findings in Table 6 indicates a contrasting effect of the adoption of 
IFRS on the allocation of the purchase price to goodwill for the two groups. For firms with an 
accounting based bonus plan the IFRS indicator variable is insignificant suggesting that the 
change in accounting requirements had no impact on the decision to recognise goodwill. 
Combined with the results documented in Table 5, this suggests CEOs which have an 
accounting based bonus-plan allocated an additional amount to goodwill both before and after 
IFRS adoption. In contrast, for firms without an accounting based bonus plan the IFRS 
indicator variable is positive and significant. As such, these firms allocated an additional 
amount to goodwill to report higher earnings only after IFRS adoption.  
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Interestingly, the unexpected finding on bidder leverage is only significant for firms 
which offer their CEO an accounting based bonus plan.  This is suggestive of heightened 
monitoring of creditors for these firms.  There is also now some evidence consistent with H3a 
as the bidding firm toehold is now negative for bidding firms whose CEOs receive an 
accounting based bonus. We also find a positive association between cash payment and 
acquired goodwill when the CEO receives a bonus. After partitioning the sample the results 
continue to suggest that the target firm economic characteristics generally do not influence the 
allocation of the purchase price to goodwill with the exception of T_GW_DV.  
5.2.2 Allocation of the purchase price to identifiable intangible assets 
The adoption of IFRS in Australia in 2005 also led to changes in the accounting for 
identifiable intangible assets. Pre-IFRS the accounting for identifiable intangible assets was 
largely unregulated and management had discretion to recognise both purchased and internally 
generated identifiable intangible assets.15 Identifiable intangible assets acquired as part of a 
business combination were required to be recorded at their fair value (AASB 1015 Acquisition 
of Assets). Furthermore, in the absence of accounting guidance, management had discretion as 
to whether intangible assets that were recorded (including those acquired in a business 
combination) were amortised systemically to the income statement.16 Post-IFRS, AASB 138 
Intangible Assets prohibited the recognition of internally generated intangible assets. 
Additionally, it requires identifiable intangible assets to be amortised if such assets have a finite 
life and to be tested annually for impairment tested if the asset’s life is considered indefinite. 
Wyatt (2005) examines the factors which are associated with the recording of intangible 
assets in Australia’s unregulated environment. The results indicate that the underlying 
economic characteristics of the firm, rather than opportunism, explain management’s decision 
to record intangible assets. A number of more recent studies examine the impact of the adoption 
of IFRS on intangible assets. For example, Chalmers et al. (2008) find evidence consistent with 
IFRS adoption in Australia improving the value relevance of goodwill. In contrast, the value 
relevance of other intangibles is found to be higher using the pre- IFRS accounting standards. 
Chalmers et al. (2011b) examine if the association between goodwill charges to the income 
                                                          
15 Prior to the adoption of IFRS there was an accounting standard regulating the manner of accounting for 
research and development (AASB 1011 Accounting for Research and Development). This standard allowed the 
capitalisation of research and development only if future economic benefits were expected to exceed costs 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
16 Wyatt et al. (2001) present descriptive evidence on the methods used to account for identifiable intangibles 
prior to the adoption of IFRS. 
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statement and a firm’s investment opportunity set changed after Australia’s adoption of IFRS. 
They show that goodwill charges have a higher association with a firm’s investment 
opportunity set only in the goodwill impairment regime (i.e., post- IFRS). Meanwhile Chalmers 
et al. (2012) find that after the adoption of IFRS, the size and dispersion of analyst forecast 
error is more negatively associated with reported intangible assets than pre- IFRS, with this 
result being driven by goodwill. 
The above discussion highlights that managers were provided broad discretion over 
whether to amortise identifiable intangible assets acquired in a business combination before 
the adoption of IFRS. If firms acted opportunistically they could maximise post- acquisition 
profits by over allocating the purchase price to such assets and not subsequently amortising 
them. Furthermore, this approach would minimise the proportion of the purchase price 
allocated to goodwill which was subject to periodic amortisation. After the adoption of IFRS, 
the necessity to amortise intangible assets was dependent on whether managers determined that 
these assets had a finite or indefinite life. In consequence, the change in accounting 
requirements for intangible assets upon adopting IFRS does not have a conclusive impact on 
post- acquisition profit as firms can continue to avoid amortisation by classifying these assets 
as having an indefinite life. 
To provide evidence on whether the change in the accounting requirements for 
intangible assets upon the adoption of IFRS influenced the allocation of the purchase price to 
identifiable intangible assets we re-estimate a modified version of model (1). This alternative 
model employs as the dependent variable the proportion of the purchase price allocated to 
identifiable intangible assets (IIA_DV). The independent variables are consistent with those in 
the original model. The results of estimating this regression (not tabulated) show that the IFRS 
indicator variable has an insignificant coefficient suggesting that the adoption of IFRS did not 
influence the percentage of the purchase price which is allocated to identifiable intangible 
assets. The other variables capturing opportunism such as the CEO bonus indicator variable 
and bidding firm leverage are also insignificant. The results indicate that a lower toehold; lower 
target PPE and higher target existing identifiable intangible assets increase the percentage of 
the purchase price allocated to identifiable intangibles. 
5.2.3 Multiple bidders 
Prior studies (e.g., Ruback 1983 and Giliberto and Varaiya 1989), document that 
acquiring firms tend to overpay when there are competing bids, consistent with there being a 
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‘winner’s curse.’ We investigate whether the presence of competing bids impacts on the 
amount of the purchase price allocated to goodwill. To control for competing bidders, we create 
an indicator variable set to equal to one if there is at least one competing bidder, zero otherwise. 
We do not find an association between acquired goodwill and the presence of competing 
bidders. The conclusions from our other results remain unchanged. 
5.2.4 Growth potential of the target firm 
To ensure that our findings are not driven by the target’s growth potential, we re-run 
the tests including an additional variable T_GROWTH. As we are unable to access actual 
growth forecasts for our sample period we use the target firms’ growth in the two years 
preceding the acquisition as a proxy for future growth. The Australian Bureau of Statistics 
provides growth forecast data up until 2002 and the IBES database contain growth forecast 
data from 2003 onwards. We do not find an association between T_GROWTH and acquired 
goodwill suggesting that acquired goodwill does not seem to capture the future growth potential 
of the target firm. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The accounting for purchased goodwill is controversial and has been subject to a 
substantial amount of previous research. An area that has received little attention in prior 
studies are the factors which determine the amount recorded as goodwill at the time the target 
firm is first consolidated into the bidding firm’s financial statements. This study addresses this 
void in the literature. Our results tend to support the argument that the allocation of the purchase 
price to goodwill is opportunistic and suggest that the amount allocated to goodwill does not 
appear to reflect synergy potential. A possible area for future research is to further refine these 
tests using better measures of target firm growth potential and synergies. 
Consistent with firms undertaking their purchase price allocation opportunistically, we 
find that the amount allocated to goodwill increases after the adoption of IFRS when goodwill 
is no longer amortised. Thus, it appears that bidding firms took advantage of this change in 
accounting requirements to allocate more to goodwill to increase reported profitability post-
acquisition. We also document a positive association between the amount allocated to goodwill 
and the use of accounting based CEO bonus plans by acquiring firms. This association was 
unchanged by the adoption of IFRS. Therefore, it appears that CEOs that are remunerated 
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partially based on accounting results have consistently allocated more to goodwill after an 
acquisition. A possible explanation of this finding is that pre- IFRS an over-allocation of the 
purchase price to goodwill increases reported profit as the life of other tangible assets are likely 
to be shorter than the 20 year life used for amortising goodwill. We also show that firms 
offering cash as payment are more likely to record goodwill.  
We also find evidence that more leveraged acquiring firms allocate a higher amount to 
goodwill. This result is inconsistent with opportunism. Our results, however, show no 
association between the use of Big 4 auditors and the amount allocated to goodwill. Supporting 
the results in earlier studies we find that a higher takeover premium results in the recording of 
additional goodwill. This result is unsurprising as any additional premium flows through to the 
amount recorded as goodwill, given that goodwill is calculated as the difference between the 
purchase price and the target firm identifiable net assets. 
Collectively, our findings highlight that managers use their discretion when conducting 
purchase price allocations following a business combination. Our results are likely to be of 
interest to accounting standard setters when debating how to account for goodwill post- 
acquisition, as our findings suggests firms have opportunistically increased their allocation of 
the purchase price to goodwill after IFRS adoption. Future research could shed further light on 
other contractual and non-contractual incentives to over or under allocate the purchase price in 
acquisitions to goodwill (e.g. earnings volatility or capital raising). In addition, future studies 
might examine whether subsequent goodwill impairment decisions are associated with factors 
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The sample comprises takeovers announced for ASX listed targets identified from the Connect 
4 Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
Takeovers between 1998 to 2012 1,239 
Less: Unsuccessful takeover bids (394) 
Less: Acquiring firms not listed on the ASX (346) 
Less: Acquiring firms which are delisted post- acquisition prior to 
releasing financial statements 
(20) 
Less: Takeovers with missing observations to test model (1) (171) 







Temporal and industry distribution of the sample 
Panel A table shows the yearly distribution of the sample by takeover announcement date. 
Panel B presents the distribution of the sample by target and bidding firm two digit GICS codes. 
Panel A: Sample temporal distribution    
Year takeover No. of % of  
Cumulative % 
announced takeovers sample 
1998 5 1.62 1.62 
1999 22 7.14 8.77 
2000 30 9.74 18.51 
2001 25 8.12 26.62 
2002 13 4.22 30.84 
2003 15 4.87 35.71 
2004 26 8.44 44.16 
2005 26 8.44 52.60 
2006 32 10.39 62.99 
2007 29 9.42 72.44 
2008 11 3.57 75.97 
2009 24 7.79 83.77 
2010 19 6.17 89.94 
2011 12 3.90 93.93 
2012 19 6.17 100 
Total 308  100   
 
Panel B: Sample GICS distribution   
Industry Bidder Target 
            Number % of sample Number % of sample 
Consumer Discretionary 46 14.94 40 12.99 
Consumer Staples 22 7.14 17 5.52 
Energy 29 9.42 25 8.12 
Financials 49 15.91 49 15.90 
Health Care 16 5.19 16 5.19 
Industrial 31 10.06 32 10.39 
Information Technology 11 3.57 17 5.52 
Materials 87 28.25 101 32.80 
Telecommunication 12 3.90 7 2.27 
Utilities 5 1.62 4 1.30 





Panel A: This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables included in regression model (1) for bidding firms reporting no goodwill and bidding firms reporting positive 
goodwill. A test of statistical difference of means for each variable is also shown.  A t-test is used for continuous variables and a χ2-test for binary variables.  All variables are 
defined in Appendix 1. 
 
  Goodwill = 0 (129 observations) Goodwill >0 (179 observations) Statistical 
difference   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GW ($m) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 364 1,250 25,000 14000 -3.301*** 
GW_DV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.563 0.472 0.000 3.227 -13.555*** 
IFRS 0.535 0.501 0.000 1.000 0.553 0.499 0.000 1.000 0.100 
B_LEV 1.272 4.044 0.011 41.691 2.082 3.839 -3.109 22.455 -1.786* 
BONUS 0.442 0.499 0.000 1.000 0.631 0.484 0.000 1.000 -13.509*** 
BONUS($000) 219.77 775.434 0.000 8,072.93 366.097 653.682 0.000 3,757 -1.792* 
BIG4 0.698 0.461 0.000 1.000 0.849 0.359 0.000 1.000 10.219*** 
RELSIZE 0.457 0.684 0.001 4.304 0.555 1.300 0.000 11.004 -0.784 
TOEHOLD 0.158 0.199 0.000 0.880 0.142 0.187 0.000 0.865 0.716 
FRIENDLY 0.868 0.340 0.000 1.000 0.838 0.369 0.000 1.000 0.539 
PREMIUM 0.462 0.984 -1.000 7.341 0.451 2.459 -0.969 31.500 0.049 
SAMEIND 0.698 0.461 0.000 1.000 0.575 0.496 0.000 1.000 4.789** 
PAYCASH 0.217 0.414 0.000 1.000 0.413 0.494 0.000 1.000 13.050*** 
T_GW_DV 0.078 0.321 0.000 2.820 0.162 0.604 0.000 7.749 -1.444 
T_PPE_DV 0.466 1.646 0.000 13.658 0.412 1.428 0.000 15.876 0.306 
T_IIA_DV 0.047 0.183 0.000 1.691 0.087 0.194 0.000 1.202 -1.843* 
T_MB 2.964 5.306 -0.171 36.776 2.349 2.816 -0.171 15.969 1.315 
B_MB 2.940 4.657 0.210 42.690 3.213 5.008 0.180 42.690 -0.487 
IIA ($m) 15.3 51.4 0.000 404 127 464 0.000 4,300 -2.720*** 
IIA_DV 0.143 0.361 0.000 1.862 0.148 0.258 0.000 1.313  -0.144 






Panel B: This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables included in regression model (1) pre- and post- IFRS adoption (Panel B).  A test of statistical difference of 
means before and after the adoption of IFRS for each variable is also shown.  A t-test is used for continuous variables and a χ2-test for binary variables.  All variables are defined 
in Appendix 1. 
  
IFRS = 0 
(140 observations) 




difference   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GW ($m) 97.9 269 0.000 1,800 306 1,290 0.000 14,000 -1.886* 
GW_DV 0.305 0.475 0.000 3.227 0.346 0.437 0.000 1.850 -0.793 
B_LEV 1.308 2.232 0.022 16.295 2.106 4.909 -3.109 41.691 -1.777* 
BONUS 0.514 0.502 0.000 1.000 0.583 0.494 0.000 1.000 -0.701 
BONUS($000) 258,363 806.563 0.000 8,072.93 343.517 617.372 0.000 3,757 -1.049 
BIG4 0.786 0.412 0.000 1.000 0.786 0.412 0.000 1.000 0.000 
RELSIZE 0.439 0.666 0.000 4.304 0.576 1.337 0.000 11.004 -1.097 
TOEHOLD 0.176 0.213 0.000 0.880 0.125 0.170 0.000 0.865 2.340** 
FRIENDLY 0.800 0.401 0.000 1.000 0.893 0.310 0.000 1.000 5.183** 
PREMIUM 0.287 0.607 -0.969 3.932 0.596 2.615 -1.000 31.500 -1.368 
SAMEIND 0.707 0.457 0.000 1.000 0.560 0.498 0.000 1.000 7.112*** 
PAYCASH 0.371 0.485 0.000 1.000 0.298 0.459 0.000 1.000 1.878 
T_GW_DV 0.157 0.714 0.000 7.749 0.102 0.211 0.000 1.078 0.954 
T_PPE_DV 0.368 0.759 0.000 6.492 0.491 1.940 0.000 15.876 -0.710 
T_IIA_DV 0.074 0.183 0.000 1.202 0.067 0.196 0.000 1.691 0.328 
T_MB 2.136 4.077 0.000 36.776 2.998 4.003 -0.171 25.955 -1.867* 
B_MB 2.191 2.194 0.210 18.240 3.855 6.173 0.180 42.690 -3.034*** 
IIA ($m) 44.9 156 0.000 1,000 110 463 0 4,300 -1.589 
IIA_DV 0.146 0.339 0.000 1.862 0.146 0.275 0.000 1.506  -0.010 







Panel C: This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables included in regression model (1) for bidding firms with and without an accounting based CEO bonus plan in 
place. A test of statistical difference of means for firms with and without a CEO bonus for each variable is also shown.  A t-test is used for continuous variables and a χ2-test 
for binary variables.  All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
  BONUS = 0 (138 observations) BONUS = 1 (170 observations) Statistical 
difference   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GW ($m) 192 1,240 0.000 14000 228 688 0.000 5,100 -0.327 
GW_DV 0.289 0.482 0.000 3.227 0.358 0.430 0.000 2.234 -1.331 
IFRS 0.507 0.502 0.000 1.000 0.576 0.496 0.000 1.000 1.472 
B_LEV 1.399 4.096 0.009 41.691 2.022 3.798 -3.109 22.455 -1.382 
BONUS($000) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 552.245 881.773 0.000 8,072.93 -7.355*** 
BIG4 0.645 0.480 0.000 1.000 0.900 0.301 0.000 1.000 29.434*** 
RELSIZE 0.544 0.758 0.004 4.304 0.489 1.293 0.000 11.004 0.440 
TOEHOLD 0.147 0.198 0.000 0.877 0.150 0.188 0.000 0.880 -0.128 
FRIENDLY 0.862 0.346 0.000 1.000 0.841 0.367 0.000 1.000 0.268 
PREMIUM 0.481 2.729 -0.883 31.500 0.434 1.033 -1.000 9.333 0.208 
SAMEIND 0.609 0.490 0.000 1.000 0.641 0.481 0.000 1.000 0.344 
PAYCASH 0.268 0.445 0.000 1.000 0.382 0.487 0.000 1.000 4.488** 
T_GW_DV 0.143 0.717 0.000 7.749 0.114 0.218 0.000 1.078 0.494 
T_PPE_DV 0.429 1.425 0.000 13.658 0.440 1.598 0.000 15.876 -0.060 
T_IIA_DV 0.042 0.115 0.000 0.696 0.093 0.231 0.000 1.691 -2.354** 
T_MB 2.686 4.563 -0.171 36.776 2.542 3.599 -0.171 25.955 0.311 
B_MB 3.190 5.866 0.210 42.690 3.025 3.867 0.180 38.790 0.296 
IIA ($m) 48.8 368 0.000 4,300 106 350 0.000 2,500 -1.383 
IIA_DV 0.142 0.337 0.000 1.862 0.150 0.277 0.000 1.313  -0.234 





Table 4 Correlation matrix 
This table presents a Pearson correlation matrix amongst the variables included in regression model (1). All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 GW ($m) 1.00                    
2 GW_DV 0.17 1.00                   
3 IFRS 0.11 0.05 1.00                  
4 B_LEV 0.12 0.11 0.10 1.00                 
5 BONUS 0.02 0.08 0.07 0.08 1.00                
6 BONUS($000) 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.33 0.39 1.00               
7 BIG4 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.31 0.21 1.00              
8 RELSIZE 0.06 -0.04 0.06 0.01 -0.03 -0.09  -0.16 1.00             
9 TOEHOLD -0.07 -0.10 -0.13 -0.08 0.01 -0.03 0.11 -0.13 1.00            
10 FRIENDLY -0.05 0.03 0.13 0.04 -0.03 -0.05  -0.15 0.04 -0.11 1.00           
11 PREMIUM -0.03 0.11 0.08 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.05 -0.07 0.05 1.00          
12 INDSAME -0.08 -0.14  -0.15  -0.22 0.03 -0.11 -0.11 0.02 0.13 -0.06 -0.02 1.00         
13 PAYCASH -0.06 0.18 -0.08 -0.02 0.12 0.18 0.12 -0.10 0.26  -0.28 -0.08 -0.03 1.00        
14 T_GW_DV -0.02 0.42 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 0.06 -0.08 0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.01 1.00       
15 T_PPE_DV -0.04 0.12 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.06 0.08 0.08 0.05 1.00      
16 T_IIA_DV -0.02 0.09 -0.02 -0.02 0.13 0.24 0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.14 0.03 -0.05 1.00     
17 T_MB 0.04 0.01 0.11 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 -0.11 0.06 -0.06 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 -0.07 -0.06 -0.11 -0.09 1.00    
18 B_MB 0.03 0.08 0.17 0.31 -0.02 -0.01 0.08 -0.06 -0.09 0.05 0.40 -0.09 -0.07 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 0.09 1.00   
19 IIA ($m) 0.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.00 -0.14 -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.12 -0.05 0.35 0.01 0.03 0.07 1.00  
20 IIA_DV 0.80 0.04 0.09 0.15 0.08 0.20 0.09 0.05 -0.07 0.00 -0.03 -0.14 -0.02 -0.04 0.07 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.20 1.00 




What drives the allocation of the purchase price to goodwill? 
This table presents the results of estimating regression model (1) with the dependent variable measuring the proportion 
of the purchase price allocated to goodwill. Standard errors are clustered by year. Target firm industry fixed effects are 
included in each model but results are not reported. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. The following Tobit 
regression is used: 
GW_DV = i + 1IFRS + 2B_LEV + 3BONUS + 4IFRSxBONUS + 5 BIG4 + 6RELSIZE 
+7TOEHOLD+ 8FRIENDLY + 9PREMIUM + 10SAMEIND +11PAYCASH + 12T_GW_DV 
+13T_PPE_DV + 14T_IIA_DV + 15T_MB + 16B_MB + i                                                                                      (1)                                                                                                                                                                                      
  pred.sign coeff t-stat p-value 
Intercept ? -0.616 -2.51 0.01*** 
Opportunism:     
IFRS + 0.211 1.94 0.05** 
B_LEV - 0.012 2.17 0.03** 
BONUS + 0.248 2.78 0.01*** 
BONUSxIFRS + -0.210 -1.36 0.18 
BIG4 + 0.102 0.97 0.33 
RELSIZE + -0.033 -1.16 0.25 
Takeover characteristics:     
TOEHOLD - -0.223 -1.10 0.27 
FRIENDLY - -0.013 -0.12 0.902 
PREMIUM  + 0.030 1.75 0.08* 
SAMEIND + -0.100 -1.63 0.10* 
PAYCASH ? 0.166 2.34 0.02** 
Economic characteristics:     
T_GW_DV + 0.444 4.91 0.00*** 
T_PPE_DV - 0.034 1.38 0.17 
T_IIA_DV - -0.143 -0.79 0.43 
T_MB + 0.00 0.20 0.84 
B_MB + 0.00 0.34 0.73 
     
Target industry fixed 
effects  yes   
Observations  308   
Pseudo R2   24.01%   




Bonus plan use and the allocation of the purchase price to goodwill 
This table presents the results of estimating regression model (1) separately for firms with and without an accounting based bonus plan. The dependent variable measures the 
proportion of the purchase price allocated to goodwill. Standard errors are clustered by year. Target firm industry fixed effects are included in each model but results are not 
reported. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. The following Tobit regression is used: 
GW_DV = i + 1IFRS + 2B_LEV + 3 BIG4 + 4RELSIZE +5TOEHOLD+ 6FRIENDLY + 7PREMIUM + 8SAMEIND +9PAYCASH + 10T_GW_DV 
+11T_PPE_DV + 12T_IIA_DV + 13T_MB + 14B_MB + i   
    CEO does not receive bonus compensation CEO receives bonus compensation 
  BONUS=0 BONUS=1 
  pred.sign coeff t-stat p-value coeff t-stat p-value 
Intercept ? -0.44 -1.47 0.14 -0.40 -1.36 0.18 
Opportunism:        
IFRS +  0.30 2.22 0.03** 0.00 0.00 0.99 
B_LEV - 0.01 -0.52 0.61 0.02 2.04 0.04** 
BIG4 + 0.14 0.90 0.37 0.11 0.84 0.40 
RELSIZE + -0.11 -0.85 0.40 -0.01 -0.34 0.74 
Takeover characteristics:       
TOEHOLD - 0.14 0.38 0.71 -0.41 -2.42 0.02** 
FRIENDLY - -0.31 -1.78 0.08* 0.05 0.69 0.49 
PREMIUM  + 0.01 0.40 0.70 0.04 0.54 0.59 
SAMEIND + -0.12 -0.97 0.34 -0.09 -1.15 0.25 
PAYCASH ? 0.11 0.98 0.33 0.16 1.69 010* 
Economic characteristics       
T_GW_DV + 0.50 5.10 0.00*** 0.59 1.51 0.13 
T_PPE_DV - 0.04 0.87 0.39 0.02 0.60 0.55 
T_IIA_DV - 0.11 0.37 0.71 -0.24 -1.34 0.18 
T_MB + 0.02 1.46 0.15 -0.02 -1.25 0.22 
B_MB + 0.02 0.83 0.41 0.00 0.43 0.67 
Target industry fixed effects yes   yes   
Observations  138   170   
Pseudo R2   32.18%     24.21%     




Variable names and definitions 
Variable name Definition 
GW The dollar value in thousands of the amount initially allocated to 
goodwill 
GW_DV The amount initially allocated to goodwill scaled by deal value 
IFRS An indicator variable denoting takeovers in which the first year of 
consolidation of the takeover  uses IFRS 
B_LEV Bidding firm ratio of debt to equity at the end of the financial year prior 
to the takeover announcement 
BONUS An indicator variable denoting takeovers in which the bidding firm CEO 
is compensated using a bonus plan based on accounting numbers 
BONUSxIFRS An interaction variable between BONUS and IFRS 
BIG4 An indicator variable denoting takeovers in which the bidding firm 
auditor is a Big Four firm for the first year of consolidation 
RELSIZE The natural logarithm of target firm to acquiring firm market 
capitalisation two months before the takeover announcement 
TOEHOLD The toehold stake of the bidder in the target firm at the announcement of 
the takeover 
FRIENDLY An indicator variable denoting target firms where the initial 
recommendation of the target firm board is takeover acceptance 
PREMIUM The takeover premium calculated as the offer price minus the target 
share price two months prior to the takeover announcement, divided by 
the price two months prior to the takeover announcement 
SAMEIND An indicator variable denoting takeovers in which the target and bidder 
firm have an identical two digit GICS code 
PAYCASH An indicator variable denoting takeovers in which the method of 
payment is exclusively cash 
T_GW_DV The amount of recorded target firm goodwill for the year prior to the 
takeover scaled by deal value 
T_PPE_DV The amount of recorded target firm property plant and equipment for the 
year prior to the takeover scaled by deal value 
T_IIA_DV The amount of recorded target firm identifiable intangible assets for the 
year prior to the takeover scaled by deal value 
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T_MB Target firm market-to-book ratio calculated two months prior to the 
takeover announcement 
B_MB Bidding firm market-to-book ratio calculated two months prior to the 
takeover announcement 
IIA The dollar value in thousands of the amount initially allocated to 
identifiable intangible assets 
IIA_DV The amount initially allocated to identifiable intangible assets scaled by 
deal value 
 
 
 
